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The Influence of Trade Unions on Pension 
Reform in Romania and Hungary:  







Although both Romania and Hungary have inherited pay-as-you-go 
defined benefit (PAYG-DB) pensions systems, they have both moved towards a 
three-pillar pensions system, in which PAYG-DB becomes just one of three 
pillars together with the mandatory and the voluntary private pension funds. 
Trade unions have had an important influence on pension reform in both 
countries. The analysis of pension reform in Hungary and Romania brings 
evidence that trade unions’ influence on policy-making is not uniform, but it is 
shaped by the international policy discourse, by the institutional setting, by their 
relationship with other policy actors, by their organisational culture and even 
material inheritance.  
 




                                                 
 
1 Monica BUCURENCIU – +40 744  600 403 
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CES – Economic and Social Council (Romanian original name: Consiliul 
Economic si Social)  
CNPAS – National House of Pensions and Other Social Security Rights 
(Romanian original name: Casa Nationala de Pensii si alte Drepturi de asigurari 
sociale)  
CNSLR-Fratia – National Confederation of Romanian Free Trade 
Unions – Brotherhood (Romanian original name: Confederatia Nationala a 
Sindicatelor Libere din Romania – Fratia)  
CSSPP – The Commission for the Supervision of the Private Pensions 
System (the Romanian original name: Comisia pentru Supravegherea Sistemului 
de Pensii Private)  
EU – European Union  
FIDESZ – Federation of Young Democrats  
IRC – (The Hungarian) Interest Reconciliation Committee  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
MSZOSZ – The abbreviation of the Hungarian name of National 
Association of Hungarian Trade Unions  
PAYG-DB – pay-as-you-go defined benefit  
PIF – (The Hungarian) Pension Insurance Fund  
PSD – (Romanian) Social Democratic Party  
WB – World Bank  
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Pensions systems all around the world are changing. “And if there is a 
common theme to that change, i.e. more private funded pensions and cuts in 
future unfunded public provision, the starting points, the rate of change and the 
size of the change are dramatically different across different countries.”   
(Disney, Johnson, 2001:1).  
 
Both Romania and Hungary are living examples of the trend towards 
more private funded pensions mentioned by Disney and Johnson. Although 
they have both inherited pay-as-you-go defined benefit (PAYG-DB) pensions 
systems
2, they have both moved towards a three-pillar pensions system, in 
which PAYG-DB becomes just one of three pillars together with the mandatory 
and the voluntary private pension funds. The three-pillar system is made up of: 
a first pillar that is a state managed, pay-as-you-go system; a second pillar that is 
a privately managed, fully funded defined contribution system without minimum 
benefit guarantees and a third pillar that is also privately managed, fully-funded, 
DC (defined contribution) system without minimum benefit guarantees 
(participation is voluntary) (Gomulka, 2002).  
 
When the formerly Communist countries of Eastern Europe began their 
transformation into market-oriented economies, reforms in social programmes 
were  only  minor  parts  of  the  adjustment  agenda  (Nelson,  2001,  p.135).          
The focus was on macroeconomic stabilization, on opening the economy and 
on privatizing former state enterprises (Nelson, 2001).  
 
Despite this focus on macro-economic stabilization policies or maybe as 
natural complement of this, serious concerns about reforming the pensions 
systems started to exist in both Romania and Hungary ever since the beginning 
of the 1990’s. However, Romania found it more difficult than Hungary to 
actually adopt any important changes until 2004: while Hungary implemented 
the reform more than 10 years ago, Romania is still struggling. Hungary adopted 
radical changes in its pensions system in mid-1997. After 7 years, Romania 
designed a similar set of reforms in two packages, one passed in 2004 and the 
second in 2007.  
 
A great deal of analysis has focused on the substance of the Hungarian 
reform and the merits and drawbacks of specific design components             
                                                 
 
2 The pay-as-you-go pension system is a system that finances benefits for retired workers in a 
given year entirely by contributions or taxes paid by currently employed workers. The present 
economically active generations pay for the ones that preceded them. 
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(Nelson, 2001); the policy-making process and its actors have been analysed to a 
much lesser extent
3. On the other hand, there has been no thorough analysis of 
the Romanian pension reform (neither in terms of design, nor  policy-making 
process), mostly because it is still an ongoing process. Although it may be much 
too early to grasp the entire reform process in Romania, I think it is still possible 
to offer a valid and reliable account of how different actors generally shaped the 
reform. For reasons of comparability, in my analysis, I will mostly focus on the 
process of negotiation among different actors before the actual implementation of 
changes.  
 
The role of trade unions in shaping the pension reform in Romania and 
Hungary is not very well documented in the literature - and therefore will be the 
central  focus  of  analysis.  Furthermore,  there  are  several  theories  on           
policy-making that have the tendency of assuming that trade unions’ interests 
and actions are quite unitary, predictable and shaped mostly by the constant 
search of trade unions’ leaders to acquire more social benefits for those whom 
they are representing. (Korpi, 1989) Trade unions are too often portrayed as 
organisations that manifest an intrinsic opposition to the interests of organised 
business or right wing political parties and politicians (Korpi, 1989). I hope that 
the analysis of the two case studies will show that reality is more complex than 
that.  
 
Although the primary focus of my analysis will be trade unions, an 
examination of other policy-making actors will be undertaken. Without an 
integrated approach to the policy-making process, it would be very hard to grasp 
the role of a specific actor. It is hard to understand the role of unions in shaping 
the reform without understanding the role of organised business, international 
organisations or political parties. The environment in which an actor shapes its 
preferences and actions is shaped by the preferences and actions of all other 
involved actors. It would, thus, become impossible to understand the role of 
any actor in isolation from the others.  
 
It is not possible to understand policy-making without understanding 
what drives the actors involved in the process. Is it material interests or ideas? 
Can one separate the two in a meaningful way in the first place? If ideas do 
matter, in what way do they matter? Do they matter because they provide actors 
with cognitive and normative frameworks? Are they just instruments used in 
                                                 
 
3 Although, this paper is concerned with the process (rather than the programme) of pensions 
systems reform in Romania and Hungary, “this distinction, however useful it may be, represents 
an oversimplification; it is impossible in practice to make a distinction between reform as a 
programme and reform as an implementation process” (Hausner, 2001, p. 231). 
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rational ways in order to maximise benefits and satisfy interests? Are they 
cooperation tools among actors with different interests? In other words, what is 
the relationship between ideas and interests and what relevance does it have for 
policy-making and especially for policy-change? One of the purposes of this 
paper will be to argue that the analysis of the pension policy-making process in 
Romania and Hungary provides further reasons for combining, rather than 
separating, the rational choice and ideational theories on policy-making.  
 
The factors that determine policy actors’ preferences and actions will 
inevitably have an impact on how we understand the process of policy-making 
as well. Thus, in the final part of my analysis, I will also try to identify the 
implications of my findings for some of the theories on policy-making. I will 
mainly focus on Weir and Skocpol’s (1985) theory and on Orenstein’s later 
refinement of it (2000). The paper will argue Orenstein’s theory is better suited 
in accounting for the policy-making process of pension reform in Romania and 
Hungary, but that further refinements of his theory are also possible.  
 
Comparability and Reason for Comparison 
 
Firstly, it can be argued that Romania and Hungary had a common 
“inheritance” in terms of pensions system: they both had former communist 
PAYG-DB systems which experienced very similar problems during the 
economic transition period (Preda, 2004; Calugaru, Pop, 2004):  
 
a) Both in Romania and in Hungary, the black market for labour grew 
rapidly, one of the main reasons being the cost of labour force;  
b) There was also an increase of the unemployment rate and a decrease 
in the number of contributors to the public pension system;  
c) Both in Romania and Hungary, due to political involvement, a great 
number of exceptions – pensioners with high pensions – were created, 
generating a higher pressure on the PAYG system;  
d) Another ‘challenge’ that the both countries faced was reversing the 
consequences of previous policies that made early retirement very easy, with no 
evident penalties; the early retirements were initially encouraged in order to 
avoid an increase of the unemployment rate;  
e) Freelancers were not included in any public pension system;  
f) Both countries also experienced a lack of transparency, mainly 
concerning the calculation of benefits/ pensions and the exceptions;  
 
Secondly, the two countries have been influenced by the same 
international organisations: the World Bank, the IMF and the EU (at a later 
stage and in a more indirect way) (Nelson, 2001, Orenstein, 2002, interviews 
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with Hungarian union leaders). The World Bank has been of particular 
importance for pension reform in post-communist Central and Eastern 
European countries, mainly because it was the main international financial 
organisation that advocated partly funded three-pillar pensions systems       
(World Bank, 1994). The World Bank’s influence in both Romania and Hungary 
was not limited to an indirect, political discourse level kind of influence. It also 
had a very direct influence on pension reform, offering both loans and technical 
expertise  (Nelson,  2001,  interviews  with  Romanian  union  leaders).                  
The comparison’s validity is enhanced by the fact that the World Bank 
advocated very similar changes in the Hungarian and Romanian systems. 
Furthermore, the similar recommendations of the World Bank should be in 
itself an indicator of the similarities that existed in terms of pensions systems in 
the two countries.  
 
There is also a geographical proximity that makes Hungary and Romania 
prone to learning from each other’s policy experiences. Both Romanian political 
and social actors, as well as the media are making constant references and 




Romanian politicians explicitly state the fact that they have been inspired 
in their reform proposals by the experience of countries like Poland and 
Hungary, although it is interesting to see that they are willing to draw only some 
lessons and not others
5, which opens up the possibility of using “lessons drawn 
from other countries” as a legitimation tool, more than a cognitive one. 
Romanian trade union leaders also make constant references to the Hungarian 
and Polish experiences, admitting that these have made them aware of several 
                                                 
 
4 Adevarul is a national Romanian newspaper. 
5 For example, both Poland and Hungary experienced very serious problems due to the fact that 
they have both implemented the new pensions system before having an integrated IT system 
that allows state institutions to keep track of individual contributions. As a consequence, after 
contributions of around 5 million Euros had been collected in Poland, it became obvious that 
there were no means of linking contributions to individual accounts because of the lack of a 
suitable IT system. As a consequence, the first contributions were equally divided among 
citizens (action which runs counter to the very founding principles of the new system). At the 
moment of implementation (August 2007), Romania also lacked an integrated IT system and 
although other countries’ experience has showed that this has been a real problem, Romanian 
politicians refused to postpone implementation in order for the integrated IT system to become 
functional. Trade union leaders have insisted on postponing implementation and have argued 
that the political refusal to do so, could be explained by the very strong business lobby to start 
the new system (interview with Romanian trade union leader).  
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potential problems of the new system, problems that they had initially ignored 
(interviews with Cartel Alfa and CNSLR-Fratia union leaders).  
 
Furthermore, similar actors were involved in shaping the reform in the 
two countries: trade unions were of crucial importance, as well as insurance 
companies and certain occupational groups (Nelson, 2001 and interviews with 
Romanian trade union leaders).  
 
However, there are of course, significant differences as well, in terms of: 
political actors, electoral and political systems, political institutions, role of 
expertise in policy-making as it is perceived by different actors, etc. (Orenstein, 
2002).  
 
In summation, it has thus far been argued that here are no serious 
problems posed to the validity of comparing Hungary and Romania in terms of 
policy-making processes. It has not, however, been explained why Romania’s 
and Hungary’s pension systems are salient cases for comparison. Comparing the 
Romanian and the Hungarian unions’ involvement in pension policy-making 
raises some interesting issues related to how institutional settings, the 
relationship between different policy actors, as well as the discourse of 
international  organisations  shape  the  involvement  of  social  actors  in          
policy-making.  
 
Methodology and Limitations 
 
In order to understand the factors that shaped trade unions’ influence 
on pension reform in Romania and Hungary, this paper uses as sources of 
information: previous academic literature on the subject, media coverage 
(Romanian and Hungarian newspapers), as well as unstructured interviews 
conducted with Romanian and Hungarian trade union leaders.  
 
The analysis in this paper is partially based on four unstructured 
interviews of leaders from two of the biggest and most important union 
confederations in Romania (CNSLR-Fratia and Cartel Alfa), as well as five 
interviews with union leaders from three different Hungarian confederations 
(three of the interviewees either still are or used to be MSZOSZ members). 
MSZOSZ is the largest and oldest union confederation in Hungary and has had 
the most important influence in pension reform.  
 
In the Hungarian case, conducting the interviews posed several 
additional problems. Having required the help of a translator in conducting the 
interviews, some subtleties might have gotten lost in the translation. The socially 
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awkward situation of having to speak through someone else might have also 
diminished my chances of establishing a “real” connection with my 
interviewees, as well as the changes of confidence developing between us. 
Furthermore, because of contingencies not worth mentioning in detail, I was 
faced with the situation of having to conduct joint interviews, instead of 
individual ones (at least in some cases). Unfortunately, this has changed the 
whole dynamic of the interviews, because the interviewees were colleagues who 
had known each other for years and were not willing to openly speak about or 
criticise the union they were both members of. One of the disadvantages of 
joint interviews is that “partners may collude to withhold information from the 
interviewer” (Arksey, Knight, 1999,  p. 77).  
 
Irrespective of these limitations, the interviewees were key players in 
pension reform and therefore they had a very good understanding of the policy-
making process.  
 
However, it has been 10 years since the Hungarian reform was 
implemented and, paraphrasing Arksey and Knight (1999, p. 82), there are 
questions about the reliability of our memoirs of yesterday, let alone 10 years 
ago. The passing of time might also make people change the way in which they 
perceive or explain certain events.  
In the Romanian case, there are other limitations that my research is 
facing, but the most important is the lack of literature on the subject of pension 
policy-making. However, I hope I have been able to partially counteract this 
limitation through the information I have obtained through my interviews.  
 
Elite interviewing is an interesting and widely analysed topic in itself, but 
it is not my purpose to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the research 
method in general. However, some of these advantages and disadvantages are 
also quite relevant for this paper. I have experienced only minor problems in 
negotiating access, having been able to efficiently draw on a pre-existing contact 
who was member of the elite in question, as some literature advises (Arksey, 
Knight, 1999). However, I did encounter the problem of interviewees being 
reluctant to answering all the questions related to my topic guide and being very 
willing to converse at lengths, but not necessarily about the particular subjects I 
had in mind. Arksey and Knight (1999) also mention this limitation of elite 
interviewing.  
 
Nevertheless, with all its limitations, I found the overall experience of 
interviewing trade union leaders as being very useful in better understanding the 
policy-making process, as well as the driving forces of some actors’ actions. 
Hopefully, the interviews are a very effective way of complementing the 
literature and official documents used in this analysis.  
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In order to understand policy-making, it is necessary to understand what 
determines the actions of different actors. Are social and political actors mostly 
driven by interest or are they driven by ideas? Does it make sense to separate the 
two in the first place? What determines the different choices that actors make in 
defining their ‘ideal’ set of policies? How does the institutional setting or the 
interaction with other involved actors shape the ideas, interests and preferences 
of a certain policy actor? The way in which these questions are answered will 
affect not only our understanding of policy-making in general, but that of policy 
change as well. Two schools of thought, rational choice and ideation, have 
primarily informed this research.  
 
For rational choice theorists, interests  are the driving force of human 
action and determine the choice of actors. Without going into much detail6, it is 
worth mentioning that one of the main critiques of rational choice theories is 
that they are based on very simplistic assumptions about human behaviour (they 
seem to assume that the only rationale behind human action is the maximisation 
of benefits). Furthermore, rational choice approaches have also been criticised 
for their “failure to deliver empirically” (Busch, 1999:31).  
 
The rational choice models are constructed on the theory of expected 
utility, which is based on the assumptions that human actors are capable of 
ordering their preferences in an unambiguous way and that they have the 
computational ability to perform the necessary calculations in order to see which 
strategy is the one maximizing their benefits (Busch, 1999). Rational choice 
theories also assume that preferences are not transitive7.  
 
However, the assumption of the unambiguous character of preference 
ordering may not hold. First of all, deciphering the environment does itself play 
a role in preference ordering: presenting the same facts in different ways may 
lead to different results; the environment does not send unambiguous signals 
(North, 1990 as cited in Busch, 1999).  
 
Second of all, even if actors had all information about the environment 
they are functioning in, it would not necessarily mean that they would be able to 
                                                 
 
6 There is a wide literature on the subject of rational choice theories and their critiques, but I 
have chosen to limit myself to this extremely brief account because this is not the main purpose 
of my paper. 
7 This means that preferences can be ordered in a hierarchical way and that they are not circular. 
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order their preferences in a non-circular way. Preference ordering may 
necessitate the “intervention” of normative frameworks, which means that ideas 
are the only way in which preference transitivity is sometimes “broken”.  
 
The ideational approach, on the other hand, seems to often position 
itself in opposition to rational choice theories, mostly focusing on processes of 
meaning that engender choices (Braun, 1999). The search for meaning entails at 
least two processes: the ordering, retaining and understanding of information 
about the world by cognitive frameworks of the mind and the evaluations based on 
norms  and  values  (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1978:206 as cited in Braun, 
1999:12). While cognitive frameworks allow us to see what “is” and what is 
”feasible”, evaluation tells us what we ought to do (Goldstein, Keohane, 1993). 
The pivotal point of many ideational approaches is that belief systems are 
socially constructed and acquired and they change with social processes; choice 
is social (Braun, 1999).  
 
The main rational choice critique of idea-based approaches is that ideas 
act only as interest-oriented vehicles or instruments used by actors to attain their 
goals (Busch, 1999). Ideas are used only as legitimation tools for political 
practices that are simply meant to further the interests of political actors.  
 
Although ideational approaches and rational choice approaches often 
seem to be constructed in opposition to one another, I hope I’ll be able to bring 
further evidence (through the analysis of my case studies) that rational choice 
theories and ideational theories can very effectively be combined in 
understanding the policy-making process. As Busch (1999) argues, the two 
approaches can very well complement each other. Due to the fact that rational 
action is not possible when preferences are circular, ideas may constitute a way 
out of this circularity; they may be very important in coordinating the 
expectations that are necessary to sustain cooperation among players with 
divergent interests; ideas act as ‘focal points in strategic interaction’ (Weingast, 
1993 cited in Busch, 1999). Far from competing with “interests” as a potential 
explanation for behavioural choices of political actors, ideational frameworks 
play a key role in defining the operational content of interests themselves 
(Smyrl, 1999:149). “We want what we want because of the way we think about 
it”, not because of some innate properties of the desired object (Blyth, 2002:29).  
 
Furthermore, different types of ideas (beliefs, values, technical ideas) are 
usually integrated in greater ‘epistemic frameworks’ (which might be referred to 
as ‘paradigms). Paradigms comprise beliefs, values and techniques shared by 
members of an epistemic community (Bernstein, 1976:89 as cited in Braun, 
1999:15). In policy-making, they “specify how problems are to be perceived, 
which goals are to be attained through policy and what sorts of techniques can 
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be used to reach those goals” (Hall, 1992:91). Paradigms have the role of 
mitigating dispersed interests in a given policy sector (Hall, 1992). For Hall, 
paradigms never simply reflect group interests; they function as a device for 
cooperation between classes or groups (Braun, 1999).  
 
However, ideas cannot be separated from interests and institutions; they 
all influence each other in numerous ways: ideas shape preferences and 
interests8, institutions influence ideas and preferences, and ideas influence 
institutions. It is very hard to isolate any of the three from the other two.  
 
Policy legacies, the institutionalised interests, the actors and ideas are all 
interconnected in the process of determining policy paradigm changes (Capano, 
1999:79). In order to explain policy change, policy-making should be placed 
within the context of political institutions and state-society relations; institutions 
provide the context within which policy change and learning takes place 
(Capano, 1999).  
 
However, not all policy changes have the same impact on policy design: 
some changes depart in a much more radical way from the initial policy design 
than others.  
 
Hall identifies three types of policy changes: first-order changes             
(minor adjustments in the system), second-order changes (retooling and 
introduction of new policy techniques) and third-order changes (a radical shift in 
the hierarchy of goals and set of instruments employed to guide policy)               
(Hall, 1993). A paradigm shift is associated with an increasing frequency and 
intensity of anomalies within the existing policy paradigm or with policy failures 
(Hall, 1993).  
 
The deep-core of world-views is very hard to change; on the other hand, 
causal beliefs (which guide our understanding of the world and our perceptions 
of feasible action) are more liable to change (Hemerijck, Van Kersbergen, 1999).  
 
Summarizing the main previous arguments, ideas have a variety of roles: 
they reduce uncertainty and ambiguity, they legitimate actions, they define the 
operational content of interests, they serve as coalition building instruments, as 
well as to coordinate expectations (and ideas are embedded in institutions) 
                                                 
 
8 The institutional position of actors will influence the definition of their interests, because 
institutions affect the degree of power, as well as the status of actors (Hemerijck, van 
Kersbergen, 1999:175) 
  31
BUCURENCIU, M.,(2009) The Influence of Trade Unions on Pension Reform in Romania and Hungary: The Role of Ideas, 
 Interests and Institutions in Policy-Making, Revista Românească pentru Educaţie Multidimensională, Year 1, No. 1, August, pp : 21-50The Influence of Trade Unions on Pension Reform in  
Romania and Hungary  
Monica Bucurenciu  
 
(Blyth, 2002:35). All these kinds of roles that ideas play will emerge in the 
analysis of the case studies that follow.  
 
The Role of Trade Unions in Pension Reform in  
Hungary and Romania  
 
a) The Role of International Organisations in Shaping Ideas and 
Interests; The Influence on Policy-Making of how Trade Unions 
Approach Expertise  
 
Undeniably, by the mid-1990s, both direct and indirect international 
influences heightened the pressure for radical pension reform in both Romania 
and Hungary (Nelson, 2001). It is impossible to understand pension reform in 
post-communist countries without being aware of the tremendous impact that 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, as well as the European 
Union9
 
had in these countries10. By offering loans and technical expertise, the 
World Bank11
 
has been the most important of the three.  
 
However, the paramount importance of World Bank’s involvement in 
pension reform in the two countries mainly stems from the fact that the WB 
was able to create a ‘dominant narrative’ that gradually became accepted by 
most domestic actors. The acceptance of this paradigm profoundly influenced 
the way in which domestic actors made sense of the world around them           
(their perception of policy legacies, institutional settings, problems of the old 
systems and solutions to those problems, etc.). And since ‘the social power of 
any set of ideas is magnified when these ideas are taken up by a powerful 
political organisation, integrated with other ideological appeals and widely 
disseminated (Hall, 1986:259), it is not hard to see why the Bank’s theories on 
pension reform were so widely accepted in post-communist countries.  
 
By shaping the cognitive frameworks of the actors involved, the WB 
also re-shaped their preferences, because once a dominant narrative is accepted, 
it will frame policy changes and reorient preferences (Radaelli, 1999).  
                                                 
 
9 The European Union’s influence manifested later and only in some of the post-communist 
European countries. 
10 The influence of international financial organizations (as well as other international 
organizations) on post-communist transition countries is a widely analysed topic. There is an 
entire body of academic literature that sheds light on this subject. 
11 However, the World Bank’s involvement in social policy reform has not necessarily been 
uniform or coherent. As Deacon concluded in one of his studies (1997), different advice has 
been offered by different consultants.  
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The structure of public policy is ‘the concrete product of a political 
process wherein purposeful actors provide and diffuse interpretation, narratives 
and paradigms’ (Radaelli, 1999:99). The publication of ‘Averting the Old Age 
Crisis…’ (World Bank, 1994) was the initial stage in the diffusion of the new 
paradigm. The book concluded with a proposal for a mandatory multi-pillar 
arrangement for old age security that diversifies risk to the fullest, through the 
mix of the private and public management, insulating the system from political 
pressures, downsizing the public pillar gradually while reallocating contributions 
to a second mandatory pillar, and increases long-term saving, capital market 
deepening, and growth through the use of full and decentralized control in the 
second pillar (World Bank, 1994). International trainings organised by the World 
Bank, as well as different forms of technical expertise offered to governments, 
were also part of the diffusion process.  
 
Policy narratives relevant to policy-making generally have the shape of 
causal stories (Stone, 1989 cited in Radaelli, 1999; Hemerijck, van Kersbergen, 
1999); ‘a persuasive policy story presents a doomsday scenario that shows the 
consequences of inaction and a positive scenario in which the favoured course 
of action is chosen; scientific uncertainty is translated into political certainty by 
the use of dominant stories in the policy process’ (Radaelli, 1999). The narrative 
presented in ‘Averting the Old Age Crisis…’ matches this description quite well: 
the consequences of inaction in the case of pension systems were presented as 
being  the  un-sustainability  of  the  current  PAYG  systems,  serious               
macro-economic problems and a failure to develop a more functional capital 
market. The positive scenario (in which the system is changed into a multi-pillar 
one) was supposed to lead to the creation of a more sustainable pension system, 
macro-economic stabilisation, growth of the equities market and increase in the 
pensioners’ quality of life.  
 
Contrary to what some of the literature may suggest, the influence of 
international organisation’s advice and expertise was not limited to 
governmental actors; all actors were influenced by the ‘new paradigm’ and by 
the general WB involvement (interviews with both Hungarian and Romanian 
trade union leaders).  
 
Only when the World Bank launched the narrative of the lack of 
sustainability of the PAYG system, as well as its harmful effects on the 
economic development of the countries, were different political and social 
actors willing to admit to the need of changing the pension system.  
The World Bank has had the very important role of helping domestic 
actors both to define the “problems” the PAYG system was facing, as well as 
identify solutions to those problems.  
 
  33
BUCURENCIU, M.,(2009) The Influence of Trade Unions on Pension Reform in Romania and Hungary: The Role of Ideas, 
 Interests and Institutions in Policy-Making, Revista Românească pentru Educaţie Multidimensională, Year 1, No. 1, August, pp : 21-50The Influence of Trade Unions on Pension Reform in  
Romania and Hungary  
Monica Bucurenciu  
 
In Romania, the acceptance of the underlying principles of pension 
reform did not necessitate a “paradigm shift”, because there was no coherent 
paradigm on pension system that dominated the political discourse at the time12. 
The lack of expertise especially among organised labour led to a surprisingly 
facile acceptance of the reform among trade union leaders (interview with 
CNSLR-Fratia leader).  
 
However, some of the Romanian trade unions gradually became 
interested in acquiring more technical expertise on pensions and the existence of 
experts at the union level has become much more common13. This has lead to 
two major outcomes: the general ideas14
 
about the possible advantages and 
disadvantages of the new system have slightly changed and negotiations among 
interested actors have shifted to a more technical level (actors have long time 
ago agreed on the overarching principles of the reform, but details do matter a 
great deal) (interview with Cartel Alfa leader).  
 
In Romania, as some unions acquire technical expertise and are able to 
set up intensive media campaigns, trade union leaders gain an important role in 
shaping the discourse on pension reform as well. The Romanian confederation 
Cartel Alfa, just to give an example, has carried out an impressive media 
campaign aiming at making people aware of the design problems posed by the 
new system (interview with Cartel Alfa leader).  
 
In Hungary, the expertise on pension reform at the union level was 
greater than in Romania and the existence of institutional arrangements that 
offered some of the unions a great deal of decision power, offered especially the 
“old”15
 
Hungarian union MSZOSZ serious incentives to oppose the reform 
(Nelson, 2001).  
 
However, something else emerges from the analysis of the case studies: 
trade unions have different organisational cultures that make them more or less 
                                                 
 
12 There was, of course, the paradigm underlying the old PAYG system, but it was not really a 
‘dominating’ paradigm at the political level, it was mostly a legacy that was taken for granted. 
13 The creation of expertise at the union level was also influenced by the World Bank. The trade 
union leaders I’ve interviewed mentioned participating in seminars and trainings organised by 
the World Bank, talking to WB experts, as well as using different WB resources. 
14 In this case, ‘idea’ is referring to ‘cognitive frameworks’. 
15 In his discussion of the influence of trade unions on pension reform in Hungary, Orenstein 
distinguishes between ‘old’ trade unions and ‘new’ trade unions (2002). The old trade unions are 
those that have inherited the structure, assets and members of the main Communist union (the 
Hungarian MSZOSZ and the Romanian Cartel Alfa are two such ‘old’ unions). Orenstein argues 
that old unions and new unions have a different status and different negotiation power 
(Orenstein, 2002). 
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open to acquiring and using technical expertise. In Romania, the two major 
union confederations have very different organisational cultures and very 
different approaches to technical expertise. While Cartel Alfa’s leaders put a lot 
of emphasis on research and detailed knowledge of how the pension system 
works (interview with Cartel Alfa leader), CNSLR-Fratia’s leaders seem to be 
more keen on arguing about general principles, rather than technicalities 
(interviews with CNSLR-Fratia’s leaders).  
 
Among its leaders, Cartel Alfa has a number of trained experts that have 
acquired in time a very thorough understanding of the technical aspects of 
pension reform (by attending seminars and trainings organised by the World 
Bank, by keeping up to date with the literature on pension reform, especially the 
one concerned with the failure/success of the World Bank three-pillar model). 
These union leaders consider that it is crucial for unions to understand all the 
technical details of the reform in order to better negotiate with other 
stakeholders.  
 
Thus, in order to understand the way in which Romanian unions got 
involved in the reform it is crucial to know that unions have a different level of 
expertise and a different organisational culture in terms of integrating technical 
ideas in their negotiations.  
 
The different role of expertise (in the two confederations) has 
consequences for the demands that the two confederations are voicing, as well 
as for the negotiation style they are generally using.  
In both Romania and Hungary, the major disagreements regarding 
pension reform turned less on values than on interpretation of facts and 
probabilities  (Nelson,  2001).  This  makes  the  importance  of  experts                  
(in interpreting facts and probabilities) absolutely crucial in understanding 
pension reform. The most important struggles were not about principles or 
goals, but about mechanisms and instruments used to attain these goals 
(interview with CNSLR-Fratia leader).  
 
The prospect of accession to the European Union also acted as 
instrument for creating social consensus on the need of reducing fiscal burdens 
(interviews with MSZOSZ leaders). The need to fulfil the Maastricht criteria 
proved to be a very effective way (in both Romania and Hungary) of creating 
consensus on the need to reform the pension system (the way  in which to 
reform it, on the other hand, is a different issue altogether) (interview with 
MSZOSZ leader). Trade union leaders themselves acknowledged that, in order 
for Hungary to join the EU, there was a need for putting a stop to the rising 
costs  of  social  security  programmes  (interview  with  MSZOSZ  leader).            
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The pressures exerted by the prospect of EU accession show that external 
constraints may promote cooperation between domestic actors (Baccaro, 2002).  
International financial institutions had a very important role in creating 
the theoretical framework of pension reform: the World Bank had a crucial role 
in producing ‘paradigm shifts’ at the domestic level. World Bank discourse on 
pension reform was very similar in Hungary and Romania, but it did not directly 
lead to similar outcomes: what mattered was the way in which domestic actors 
understood and made use of the new paradigm. The accession criteria imposed 
by the EU also acted as a tool for consensus among domestic actors, because all 
actors became aware that cuts in social spending were needed in order to satisfy 
the accession criteria.  
 
b) The role of Political Institutions and Other Domestic Actors in 
Shaping Trade Union’s Ideas and Interests  
 
Although international institutions had a very important role in shaping 
the discourse on pension reform in both Romania and Hungary, it must not be 
forgotten that it is mainly the interaction between different domestic actors that 
shapes policy outcomes. Political parties, organised business, trade unions – all 
have an important say in how social policies will look. Due to the fact that this 
paper is concerned with the influence of trade unions on pension reform, the 
following analysis will mainly focus on the policy-making aspects that are 
relevant to trade unions’ involvement: the institutional setting, the relationship 
between unions and political parties and the relationship between unions and 
organised business. Although the electoral, as well as the political system also 
shape policy change (Haggard, 2001), they are normally not very relevant in 
explaining trade unions’ involvement in policy-making.  
 
Political institutions have an important role in shaping the preferences 
and actions of social actors (Haggard et all, 2001). Interest groups find their 
opportunities restricted by the structure of political institutions (Orenstein, 
2002). Thus, it is to be expected for the pre-reform institutional setting in both 
Romania and Hungary to have shaped the interests and influence of trade 
unions.  
In Hungary, the social security budget was removed from the general 
budget in the early 1990s. In 1993, two new funds were established to manage 
social-security contributions for pensions and health (Nelson, 2001 and 
interview with MSZOSZ leaders).  
 
The Pension Insurance Fund and the Health Insurance Fund had 
elected governing boards composed in equal halves of representatives of union 
federations and employers (Nelson, 2001 and interview with MSZOSZ 
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member). The two social insurance funds were relatively free from “hard budget 
constraints”, as well as relatively politically independent16
 
(Haggard et all, 2001).  
 
Among union representatives, the MSZOSZ clearly dominated (Nelson, 
2001:248; interview with MSZOSZ leader). Until 1998, when FIDESZ17
     
(the 
new governing party) eliminated the boards, the Pension Insurance Fund 
represented a valuable asset for the union federation because of its control over 
major flows of money, that might have ‘permitted financial manoeuvring widely 
believed to have benefited the union as an institution, key leaders, and political 
parties’ (Nelson, 2001:248).  
 
The institutional setting led to disagreements among trade unions, 
because some of the ‘new’ trade unions (for example SZEF - the major union 
confederation representing public service workers) favoured reforms, while the 
‘old’ MSZOSZ opposed it (Nelson, 2001), the main reason being that the         
pre-reform institutional setting offered a lot of decision power to the MSZOSZ, 
and almost none to the ‘new’ unions. A tripartite organisation, the Interest 
Reconciliation Council was also established in 1991 and “had the potential to 
steer overall macroeconomic practice” (Haggard et all, 2001:82). However, its 
role was problematic, because the IRC was not authorized to reach binding 
decisions on macroeconomic policy (Haggard et all, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
Council offered an alternative forum for debates that increased the possibilities 
for stalemate over policy issues (Haggard et all, 2001 and interview with 
Hungarian trade union leader). In terms of its influence on pension reform, the 
IRC succeeded in “reducing the weight of the private pillar within the system” 
(Haggard et al., 2001:83 and interview with Hungarian trade union leader).  
 
The institutional design that existed during reform negotiations led to 
disagreements among members of the MSZOSZ (Nelson, 2001). Those who 
were union representatives in the Pension Insurance Fund opposed reform, 
while those who were union representatives in the Interest Reconciliation 
Council (The Hungarian Tripartite Commission) were more moderate         
(Nelson, 2001:248).  
 
The way in which the institutional setting was constructed in Hungary 
led to disagreements both between unions and within them.  
 
                                                 
 
16 Each fund was placed under the control of union representatives elected by the population at 
large. 
17 FIDESZ (The Federation of Young Democrats ) is a right-wing Hungarian party. 
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In Romania, on the other hand, unions had no institutional incentive to 
oppose reform, because the only mechanism through which unions could get 
involved in the decision-making process was through the tripartite commissions 
that existed at the ministerial level and through informal lobby (interview with 
CNSLR-Fratia leader). The reform brought about the creation of two additional 
institutions which offered the unions extra formal channels of influence. First, 
there was the creation of a tripartite committee, the Economic and Social 
Committee, which reunited government officials, trade unions representatives, 
as well as organised labour representatives (www.ces.ro). Although the 
committee’s decisions are not binding, the legislators are obliged by law to ask 
for the opinion of social actors, whenever a new law is drafted (www.ces.ro; 
interview with CNSLR-Fratia leader). The evaluations of legislative drafts that 
the CES makes public may sometimes create a lot of public pressure on the 
government to take into account the proposals of social actors (interview with 
CNSLR-Fratia leader).  
 
The creation of the National House of Pensions and Other Social 
Security Rights (CNPAS) also increased the influence of trade unions on 
pension policy-making, because trade unions are represented in its governing 
board (www.cnpas.ro, interview with Cartel Alfa leader).  
As opposed to Hungarian trade unions, Romanian trade unions had very 
serious institutional incentives not to oppose pension reform and, indeed, they 
did not.  
 
The opposition of some Hungarian trade unions to pension reform and 
the acceptance of Romanian trade unions can easily be explained by the rational 
choice approach: actors chose to support the institutional setting that offered 
them greater power and a better chance of maximizing their benefits                 
(Busch, 1999). It can also be argued that MSZOSZ members used the 
normative idea of the importance of solidarity in society as a ‘hook’ (Shepsle, 
1985 as cited in Busch, 1999:32), as a way of legitimizing their interests. 
However, the MSZOSZ had solidaristic leanings (Nelson, 2001), but, in this 
case, those were used only as tools in attaining other goals.  
 
While the institutional setting is very important in understanding trade 
unions’ preferences, the relationship between political parties and unions is also 
very relevant in grasping the access of social actors to the political arena and to 
policy-making (Orenstein, 2002). However, the influence that a social actor can 
gain through its relationship with political actors is shaped by the electoral and 
political system of the country. For instance, an interest group that has close 
relations with a dominant party in Parliament may have a good chance of 
influencing policy in a parliamentary system, but little chance in a presidential 
system (Orenstein, 2002). The relationship between unions and political parties 
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is very important in understanding pension reform, because a congruence of 
interests between socialist parties and unions increases the political power of 
unions, as well as the probability for union proposals to be accepted by the 
government (Anderson,Meyer, 2003).  
 
In both Hungary and Romania, the government’s capacity to generally 
manage union opposition was enhanced by the strong links between the old 
unions (that were the most powerful as well) and the post-communist socialist 
parties (Nelson, 2001; ‘Adevarul’ on-line archive). In Hungary, the Socialist 
Party contained a sizable MSZOSZ component (Nelson, 2001). In the 
Romanian case, the relationship between the old CNSLR-Fratia union and the 
social democratic party was quite intricate. There were many attempts to create 
joint political and social units that would bring together Social Democratic 
politicians and CNSLR-Fratia members (‘Adevarul’ on-line archive), the main 
purpose of the creation of such units being for the political party to offer 
support for union proposals in the political arena and for the social actors to 
offer support for party proposals and for implementing reform (‘Adevarul’    
on-line archive). However, although such units existed for a short period of 
time, they could not last long enough to survive the coming to power of the 
Social Democratic Party (idem).  
 
The coalitions that so often emerge between social democratic parties 
and trade unions are an indicator of the fact that ideas can be used as devices for 
creating coalitions among actors with different interests (Blyth, 2002).  
 
Not very surprisingly, private insurers were also among the major 
stakeholders of the reform, as well as (in the Hungarian case) the firms that were 
already functioning in the third pillar of voluntary pension funds (Nelson, 2001). 
These firms wanted to reduce the costs of participating in the second pillar by 
persuading legislators to permit them to use the same infrastructure that they 
had developed for the third pillar.  
 
In Romania, business lobby was particularly strong and trade union 
leaders feel that it was very successful as well. This success is most apparent in 
the legislative changes that have been approved in 2007. The 2007 legislative 
modifications give the CSSPP (The Commission for the Supervision of the 
Private Pensions System18) a lot of decision power in changing both the 
administration fees that pension funds are allowed to charge, as well as the 
                                                 
 
18 The CSSPP is the specialized and autonomous public authority dedicated to inspecting and 
regulating the functioning of the private pension system, under control of the Romanian 
Parliament. 
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minimum profitability rate below which pension funds are not authorized to 
continue functioning (interview with Cartel Alfa leader). Furthermore, due to 
the fact that the fees paid by insurance funds cover the functioning costs of the 
CSSPP, trade union leaders argue that this very fact diminishes the 
independence of the supervisory commission from business lobby (interview 
with Cartel Alfa leader).  
 
Experience shows that a permanent tension exists between the two main 
union confederations in Romania (CNSLR-Fratia and Cartel Alfa). Not only do 
they have a different way of perceiving the role of technical expertise in       
policy-making, they also have very different views about the relationship that 
should exist between unions and political parties, as well as unions and 
organized labour. While Cartel Alfa leaders explicitly state that they are ‘fierce 
enemies of organized business’ (interview with Cartel Alfa leader), CNSLR-
Fratia seem to be much more willing to accommodate business interests and do 
not seem to consider that businesses should not profit from the reform. On the 
contrary, they consider that in order for the new system to function properly, 
the law must be designed so as to attract more business participation in the 
system (interview with CNSLR-Fratia leader). CNSLR-Fratia accuses Cartel Alfa 
of trying to push forward proposals that would make the system unattractive to 
insurance companies and banks and would, on the long run, erode the new 
system (interview with CNSLR-Fratia leader).  
Cartel Alfa’s leaders see the relationship between unions and business as 
being a permanent and intrinsic antagonism; the role of unions is to oppose 
organized business’ interest, to limit the influence of business lobby on social 
policies as much as possible.  
 
In Romania, business lobby and pressure exerted by business 
organizations is not limited to government officials or politicians. Trade union 
leaders themselves are targets of business lobby. Insurance companies offer 
different kinds of incentives to trade union leaders in order for those to 
persuade as many employees as possible to adhere to certain pension funds, as 
opposed to others (interview with CNSLR-Fratia leader). However, it is not 
clear whether union leaders have so far accepted any of these offers.  
 
Interestingly enough, although there are disagreements among union 
confederations, most union proposals related to pension reform are drafted by 
Cartel Alfa experts and then signed by all five major union confederations in 
Romania. The disagreements that confederations might have with each other are 
not normally made public, but are kept at the negotiation table among unions, 
so that in the eyes of the public, there is no disagreement among the major 
union confederations concerning pension reform (interview with CNSLR-Fratia 
leader).  
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In Romania, union representatives and business representatives often 
accuse each other of having “unorthodox” ways of influencing the activity of 
the CSSPP. Organized business representatives claim that some of the CSSPP’s 
members are biased towards union proposals, especially due to the political links 
between old unions and the social democratic party (Adevarul, on-line archive). 
On the other hand, some trade unions accuse organized business of having a 
“special relationship” with some of the CSSPP’s members.  
 
In Hungary, MSZOSZ leaders had the same approach to defining the role of 
business in pension reform as the Romanian Cartel Alfa. Insurance funds and banks 
should not gain any serious profits from administering the second pillar, because 
if the government obliges citizens to contribute to private pension funds, it is 
not morally correct for insurance funds to gain profits. More radically put, ‘the 
government should not oblige its citizens to help private companies gain profits’ 
(interview with Hungarian trade union leader).  
 
Implications for the Understanding of the  
Policy-Making Process  
 
The way in which actors’ ideas and interests are shaped by different 
factors will also have implications for our understanding of the policy-making 
process.  
 
In analysing the policy-making process of pension reform in Hungary, 
Orenstein (2002) draws attention to the fact that many studies have shown that 
institutional legacies of the communist welfare state regime are among the most 
important factors influencing social policy during the post-1989 transition 
(Orenstein, 2002).  
 
This emphasis that exists in the literature on the role of policy legacies in 
explaining post-communist policy-making suggests that maybe Weir and 
Skocpol’s state-centred approach may be best suited in explaining the realities of 
Central and Eastern European countries. Weir and Skocpol (1985) argue that 
the institutional structures of the state play a critical role in determining the 
access and weight of various interests and coalitions. Their main argument is 
that the organisational structure of states indirectly influences politics for all 
groups in society; the administrative, the fiscal, coercive and judicial 
arrangements of given states, as well as the policies that states are already 
pursuing, influence the conception that groups or their representative are likely 
to develop about what is desirable, or possible in the realm of governmental 
action (Weir, Skocpol1, 1985). Elaborated to explain the different ways in which 
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states embraced or did not embrace Keynesian policies in the 1930s, the model 
showed how state structures and policy legacies shaped the adoption of 
economic reforms (Orenstein, 2002).  
Weir and Skocpol showed that government social policies are the 
outcome of a complex, path dependent process whereby politicians, usually 
situated in positions determined by the institutional configuration of the old 
system, respond to ideas generated or interpreted through the mechanisms of 
the old system, and respond to social groups whose interests and expectations 
are also influenced by, and expressed through, the old system (Weir, Skocpol, 
1985).  
 
Weir and Skocpol’s state-centred theory on policy-making can maybe 




The state structures and policy legacies will influence which intellectual 
innovations become policy-relevant, as well as the activities of politicians and 
officials and the politically expressed demands of social groups. On the other 
hand, social groups’ demands and politicians’ activities will also shape each 
other.  
 
However, Weir and Skocpol’s state-centred policy-making theory cannot 
completely account for the factors that were involved in shaping pension reform 
in Romania and Hungary, mainly because it does not include the mediating role 
of political institutions and the influence of international organizations in the 
model (Orenstein, 2002). A better account of the policy-making process will 
have to take into consideration the direct and indirect influence of international 
organizations.  
 
Having analysed the process of pension reform in three post-communist 
countries (Hungary, Poland and Kazakhstan), Orenstein tries to refine Weir and 
Skocpol’s theory by further integrating the role of international actors as well 
(Orenstein, 2002).  
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Due to the fact that Orenstein’s policy-making theory takes into account 
the direct and indirect influences of international institutions, it is better suited 
than Weir and Skocpol’s theory in explaining the policy-making process of 
pension reform in countries like Romania and Hungary. However, I think that 
further minor refinements can be brought to Orenstein’s theory as well: the way 
in which policy legacies are perceived will also be influenced by the discourse of 
international institutions (for example, the diffusion of the World Bank’s idea 
that the PAYG system is unsustainable on the long-term will also influence the 
way in which domestic actors perceive policy legacies). Furthermore, I think 
more emphasis is needed on the influence that the expertise of international 
organisations has on social actors. As this paper tries to show, in Romania and 
Hungary, trade unions’ ideas and interests were both directly and indirectly 
affected by the political discourse and political interventions of international 
organisations. More emphasis should be put on the influence of the 
organisational culture of social actors and their use of technical expertise on 
policy-making. This is how the policy-making process would look like, taking 
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In order to understand how specific actors influence the process of 
policy-making, it is absolutely necessary to understand what drives them: the 
ideas and interests they have and how these two interact with each other.               
On the other hand, both ideas and interests are in their own turn shaped by 
various factors (institutions, for example, have a particularly important role in 
this respect). What this paper tried to show is that unions’ influence on social 
policy reform and on social policies in general varies a great deal and that trade 
unions (through their leaders) do not always ‘push’ for more social benefits, in 
the same way in which organised business does not always seek to retrench 
social policies (Swenson, 2002).  
 
Furthermore, I think that the policy-making literature has not offered 
enough attention to the way in which the structure and organisational culture of 
social actors (not only governmental or political ones) influence policy outcomes. 
So far, although the general role of knowledge and technical expertise in     
policy-making has been repeatedly acknowledged, I have not encountered many 
accounts of the ways in which trade unions’ approach to using and acquiring 
technical expertise shapes policy outcomes.  
 
Ideas as cognitive frameworks have an important role in how policy 
actors shape their understanding of the world around them, as well as their 
preferences. But ideas also often act as tools for policy-making actors and it is 
undeniable that at the negotiation table, a thorough understanding of the issue 
at stake will always prove to be an advantage. This is why it is  relevant to 
understand how different social actors acquire and use technical expertise.         
The way in which different trade unions use the theoretical knowledge of 
economist and social policy experts will have a great impact on how they 
influence reform. As one of my interviewees was saying, Romanian unions very 
easily agreed to pension reform mainly because they did not have the technical 
expertise at the time that would have allowed them to see the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of the new system (interview with Cartel Alfa 
leader). However, although cognitive frameworks do matter, they are not the only 
ones that do: institutional settings matter as well19. When one of the biggest 
Hungarian confederations (MSZOSZ) strongly opposed reform, it was quite 
clear to many of the ones involved in the process that it did so mostly because 
its leaders had a lot of decision power in the pre-reform institutional setting.  
                                                 
 
19 To separate the two is slightly artificial, taking into consideration the fact that ideas will also 
influence the way in which actors perceive different institutional settings and their benefits-
maximisation potential. 
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Based on the analysis of my two cases studies, it can be argued that ideas 
have had a tremendous role in the way in which unions influenced the pension 
reform in Hungary and Romania. Both in the Hungarian and in the Romanian 
case, ideas acted as ‘cognitive frameworks’, shaping social actors’ perception of 
the institutional environment. Ideas also acted as ‘hooks’: as interest-oriented 
vehicles or instruments used by actors to attain their goals (Shepsle, 1985 as 
cited in Busch, 1999, p. 32). The MSZOSZ leaders may have used solidarity as a 
‘hook’ only in order to further their interests of keeping the pre-reform 
institutional setting and in remaining in control of the Pension Insurance Fund. 
However, the MSZOSZ had solidaristic leanings in the first place that probably 
contributed to their initial opposition to reform (Nelson, 2001:248): probably 
‘solidarity’ really did constitute one of the union’s values, but in the same time, it 
was used as a “hook” as well. It may be that the normative frameworks of actors 
set boundaries to the options these actors have in terms of which ideas they can 
use as ‘hooks’.  
 
The peculiar institutional design of the Hungarian system led to 
disagreements between members of the same union. The MSZOSZ members 
that were part of the Interest Reconciliation Committee (the Hungarian 
tripartite committee) were more open to discussing the possibility of reforming 
the pension system, compared to those members that were only part of the PIF. 
Disagreements among Hungarian trade unions stemmed from the institutional 
design and the different preferences that were shaped by it.  
 
Unlike the Hungarian trade unions, the Romanian trade unions had no 
institutional incentive to oppose reform. They actually had incentives to support 
it, because the post-reform institutional setting included (in addition to the 
former one) the National House of Pensions (CNPAS) and the Economic and 
Social Committee (institutions that both offered trade unions more influence on 
policy-making than they used to have).  
 
In Romania, disagreements among trade unions were mainly a 
consequence of the different relationship they had with other  stakeholders.     
The main source of disagreement was the nomination of the unions’ 
representative for the CSSPP (The Commission for the Supervision of the 
Private Pensions System). Other unions accused CNSLR-Fratia of having 
nominated a person that may be biased in favouring organised business’s 
interests, and not those of trade unions.  
 
The close relationship between CNSLR-Fratia and the Social 
Democratic Party, as well as its much friendlier approach to organised business, 
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had a negative impact on its relationship to other confederations, such as Cartel 
Alfa.  
 
In Hungary the unions did not initially speak in one voice, while in 
Romania they seem to have initially agreed quite easily both on the need to 
reform the old system and on the three pillar design of the new system. 
However, as trade union leaders have acquired more expertise, some differences 
among unions did begin to emerge.  
 
The analyses of pension reform in Hungary and Romania also has 
implications for theories on policy-making. As Orenstein argues, analysis of 
social reform in post-communist countries will shed light on the shortcomings 
of certain classic policy-making theories: there is a need to take into account the 
role of international organisation in shaping the policy process both directly 
(through interventions) and indirectly (through the policy discourse).  
 
The analysis of pension reform in Hungary and Romania brings further 
evidence that trade unions’ influence on policy-making is shaped by the 
international policy discourse, by the institutional setting, by their relationship 
with other policy actors, by their organisational culture and even material 
inheritance. ‘Old’ unions that have inherited various assets, as well as an 
infrastructure from the former communist unions (Orenstein, 2002) will have a 
different role in policy-making than the new trade unions. The role of trade 
unions in policy-making is not uniform. In the same way in which capital is not 
always against the development of certain social policies (Swenson, 2002), trade 
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Appendix  
Topic guide of unstructured interviews held in May and June 2007 
with various Romanian and Hungarian trade union leaders:  
 
The involvement of trade unions in the functioning of the pension 
system before the reform  
Pre-reform institutional settings (emphasis on institutions where unions 
were directly involved)  
The first reaction to reform proposals of major trade unions  
The overall proposals of trade unions in reforming the first pillar  
Overall proposals of trade unions for the second and third pillars  
The main governmental proposals that were opposed by unions and the 
reasons for opposition  
Formal or informal involvement of trade unions in reforming the 
pension system  
Major disagreements between trade unions and the other actors involved 
in the process of policy-making (government, organised business, banks, 
insurance funds)  
Details about negotiation mechanisms used by the state in its relation 
with trade unions  
The relationship between trade unions and governing parties, as well as 
other political parties  
Divergence or convergence of interests among different union 
confederations  
Involvement of trade unions in monitoring and evaluating the new 
system.  
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